improve their position by joining a coalition [8, 11, 22] .
Coalition formation and stability have been an active research area in game theory [1, 12, 13, 19] . The coalition analysis considered here is confined to the graph model for conflict resolution paradigm. As Kilgour et al. [11] put it, coalition analysis assesses whether self-interested and independent DMs can gain by forming a coalition and coordinating their moves. This paper follows the idea in [11, 22] and treats coalition analysis as a post-stability analysis. The implication is that only equilibria identified in the stability analysis stage will be examined for coalition stability. The rationale is that a non-equilibrium state is not sustainable as at least one DM is expected to deviate from it unilaterally based on the DM's calculations. An equilibrium, on the other hand, is expected to sustain for a while since no DM is motivated to depart from it as per individual contemplations. However, when two or more DMs form a coalition, an equilibrium may be upset via a sequence of joint moves by the coalition members. In this case, the target state should also be an equilibrium as any non-equilibrium state is transient. This process is referred to as an "equilibrium jump" in [11] . Understandably the target state of an equilibrium jump should presumably make all members in the coalition better off and cannot be achieved by any DM acting individually. Coalition analysis, therefore, aims to alert the analyst whether such a coalition exists and, if existent, which equilibria are vulnerable to equilibrium jumps and how these jumps are attained by coalition joint moves.
When a state is assessed for individual stability, different solution concepts such as Nash stability (Nash) [18] , general metarationality (GMR) [7] , symmetric metarationality (SMR) [7] , and sequential stability (SEQ) have been proposed to characterize DMs' distinct behavioural patterns in face of conflict [3] . For details of the characteristics and interrelationships of these solution concepts, readers are referred to Fang et al. [3] and the original references therein.
The original graph model methodology employs a simple preference structure, consisting of strict preference (≻) and indifference (∼) relations, to characterize DMs' relative preference over feasible outcomes. To accommodate the case that some preference infor-mation is unknown to the analyst, Li et al. [14] develop a non-probabilistic framework to handle preference uncertainty in the graph model where a new binary relation U is introduced to represent a DM's uncertainty about its preference between two states. The four solution concepts, Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ, have been redefined based on the extended preference structure. Depending on how unknown preferences are incorporated, four versions of stability definitions are put forward and labeled as a, b, c, and d accordingly. These different extensions are conceived to reflect the focal DM's distinct attitudes towards preference uncertainty, ranging from conservative, to mixed and aggressive [14] .
Within the graph model framework, coalition analysis has been actively studied. Motivated by the strong equilibrium concept by Aumann [1] , Kilgour et al. [11] introduce a coalition Nash stability concept with simple preference and the aim is to alert whether a status quo equilibrium can be upset by joint moves coordinated by a subset of DMs or a coalition. Subsequently, Inohara and Hipel [8] extend the idea and define coalition GMR, SMR, and SEQ stability. The interrelationships of these coalition stabilities are then examined [9] . For tractability, the aforesaid research has been confined to transitive graphs with the simple preference structure, in which consecutive moves by the same DM are allowed. By exploiting a convenient matrix system, Xu et al. [22] investigate coalition Nash stability with preference uncertainty for general graph models, where the requirement of no successive moves by the same DM is honoured to keep the new development consistent with the general decision rule in the graph model methodology. According to how uncertain preferences are incorporated, conservative and aggressive coalition Nash stabilities are introduced [22] .
Building upon the research by Xu et al. [22] and Inohara and Hipel [8, 9] , the contribution of this article is to integrate preference uncertainty into coalition GMR, SMR, and SEQ stabilities. To keep notation consistent with individual stabilities in Li et al. [14] , four different versions of each coalition stability will be defined accordingly.
To illustrate how this new development can be applied in practice, a coalition analysis is conducted for a case study of bulk-water export conflict occurred in the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador in Canada. This conflict was first examined by Fang et al. [4] and a three-DM graph model is established to investigate strategic interactions among different stakeholders. Subsequently, preference uncertainty is introduced into the model to characterize the oscillating attitude of the provincial government towards bulk-water export from its jurisdiction [14] . These analyses furnish useful strategic advice on how different stakeholders may act and react to bring the conflict to potential resolutions. The current analysis moves one step further by investigating which equilibria are sustainable and will not be upset by coalition moves and which equilibria are likely to be transient and susceptible to be overturned by a subgroup of DMs coordinating their moves. The aim is to shed additional structural insights on whether any DM may further improve its position by joining a coalition.
To make the paper self-contained, the next section briefly reviews the graph model for conflict resolution and puts the current research in a proper context. Section 3 defines coalition GMR, SMR, and SEQ stabilities with preference uncertainty. Section 4 investigates interrelationships of coalition stabilities within each extension and across the four extensions, followed by an illustrative case study in Section 5. The paper concludes with some remarks in Section 6.
Preliminaries

The graph model for conflict resolution
A graph model consists of a set of DMs N, 2 ≤ |N | < ∞, a finite set of feasible states S, a collection of digraphs G i = (S, A i ), i ∈ N , where S is the vertex set and A i is DM i's set of directed arcs in G i and depicts the moves among feasible states controlled by DM i, and relative preference over the feasible states for all DMs [3] . When a graph model is not too big, it is often convenient to draw an integrated digraph for all DMs where arcs are appropriately labeled with controlling DMs. As the graph model has the flexibility in characterizing common moves, it is possible that two arcs a 1 and a 2 may share the same pair of starting and terminal states s 1 and s 2 , i.e., a 1 = (s 1 , s 2 ) and a 2 = (s 1 , s 2 ). In this case, these common moves must be controlled by different DMs such
Preference information plays a central role in conducting a stability analysis. The original graph model adopts a pair of binary relations {≻ i , ∼ i }, the so-called simple preference, to represent DMs' relative preference over feasible states. In practice, the analyst may have a hard time in obtaining accurate preference information about the conflict when complicated and multiple criteria have to be evaluated [5, 6] , and sometimes, even the DMs themselves cannot tell their true preference when the conflict is still ongoing and evolving. To handle partially unknown preferences, Li et al. [14] [14] , the uncertain preference relation can be intransitive. The new development here inherits this fine property and is applicable to both transitive and intransitive preferences.
Existing coalition analysis in the graph model
Coalition analysis has been studied in the graph model with simple preference under four solution concepts, Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ [8, 9, 11] . Xu et al. [22] further extend coalition Nash stability to accommodate uncertain preference. Below, a brief introduction is presented for the existing coalition analysis research.
A subset of DMs H ⊆ N is called a coalition. Generally speaking, an empty coalition H does not have any realistic meaning and, hence, it is hereafter assumed that |H| ≥ 1.
When |H| = 1, the coalition H is called trivial as it contains only a single DM. If |H| > 1, the coalition is nontrivial.
Before stability definitions are introduced, it is necessary to characterize a DM's potential moves starting from a status quo state s, the following lists define DM i's possible moves incorporating different preference information [3, 14] . is comprised of all states that are attainable from a particular state via a legal sequence of unilateral moves (UMs) by any subset of DMs in the coalition, where a DM may move more than once but not consecutively [3] . In existing coalition analysis research with simple preference in the graph model [8, 9, 11] , the rule of no consecutive moves by the same DM is lifted for the sake of tractability. The implication is that the applicability of the research is restricted to transitive graph models. Xu et al. [22] 
Definition 2 A unilateral improvement or uncertain move (UIUM) by H is a member of R
If each move in the legal sequence is restricted to be a UI for the mover, the resulting set will be the coalition UI list R + H (s) starting from state s for coalition H. For brevity, the definition of R + H (s) is omitted here. To define coalition stability, Kilgour et al. [11] introduce the following concept of coalition improvement (CI).
Definition 3 For a status quo state s and a nonempty coalition
H ⊆ N , a state s 1 ∈ R H (s) is a coalition improvement for H from s, denoted by s 1 ∈ CR + H (s), iff s 1 ≻ i s for every i ∈ H.
It is worth noting that CR
denotes all states that are attainable by coalition H via legal sequences of UIs from s. Although each individual move is a UI for the mover, there is no guarantee that the terminal state is preferred to s by any DM involved in the sequence of moves [3] . On the contrary, CR + H (s) ensures that the terminal state is always preferred to s by all DMs in the coalition though an individual move along the sequence may not be a UI for the mover [11] .
This paper envisages coalition analysis as a post-stability analysis and examines whether equilibria that are stable for all DMs under individual calculations are vulnerable to joint moves by coalitions. Therefore, both the status quo and target states are presumably equilibria. Next, coalition stabilities under Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ with simple preference are furnished.
Definition 4 State s ∈ S is Nash stable for coalition H ⊆ N , denoted by s ∈ S
CN ash H
, iff
This coalition Nash stability is adapted from [11] , but CR + H (s) here is expected to honour the rule of no successive moves by the same DM and, hence, this definition is applicable to both transitive and intransitive graph models. As mentioned earlier, an empty coalition does not have any realistic meaning, it is assumed hereafter that |H| > 0.
In this special case, Definition 4 is reduced to individual Nash stability [18] . However, for a nontrivial coalition H ⊆ N, |H| ≥ 2, coalition Nash stability checks the coalition improvement list CR
If state s ∈ S is Nash stable for every nonempty coalition H ⊆ N , it is called coalitionally Nash stable and denoted by s ∈ S CN ash .
For notational convenience, let s ⪰ i t represent s ≻ i t or s ∼ i t, and Φ ⪯ H (s) = {t ∈ S ∶ s ⪰ i t for at least one i ∈ H}. It is apparent that Φ ⪯ H (s) considers only the preference relative to state s without examining the reachability of those states from s by H.
Definition 5 State s ∈ S is general metarational (GMR) for coalition H ⊆ N , denoted by s ∈ S
CGM R H
, iff for every
This coalition GMR definition is adapted from [8, 9] . Instead of using subclass reachable lists as in [8, 9] , a coalition reachable list by the opponents is adopted here. Under the assumption of no consecutive moves by the same DM in a legal sequence of UMs, Definition 5 is equivalent to Definition 7 in [8] . Similarly, if H = {i}, this definition is reduced to individual GMR [7] .
If state s ∈ S is GMR for every coalition H ⊆ N , it is called coalitionally GMR stable and denoted by s ∈ S CGM R .
Definition 6 State s ∈ S is symmetric metarational (SMR) for coalition H ⊆ N , denoted by s ∈ S
CSM R H
This coalition SMR definition is adapted from [8, 9] and is equivalent to Definition 9 in [8] . The only difference here is, once again, the incorporation of no consecutive moves by the same DM in any sequence of UMs. Similarly, if H = {i}, Definition 6 is reduced to individual SMR [7] .
If state s ∈ S is SMR for every coalition H ⊆ N , it is called coalitionally SMR stable and denoted by s ∈ S CSM R .
Definition 7 State s ∈ S is sequentially stable (SEQ) for coalition H ⊆ N , denoted by
Remark: By employing the subclass improvement list concept, the coalition SEQ stability definition introduced by Inohara and Hipel [8, 9] is able to consider credible sanctions by subcoalitions in the opponent camp. But this thoroughness comes at a significant computational cost as the number of subcoalitions increases exponentially with the number of opponents, making the calculation of subclass improvement list prohibitively difficult when the number of DMs in the model is large. In addition, it remains open about how to enforce the legality of sequences of moves by subcoalitions. As a tradeoff, it is proposed here to treat opponents N − H as individuals. For transitive graph models, if a state is SEQ for a coalition under Definition 7 here, it is automatically SEQ for the coalition under Definition 11 in [8] . However, the inverse is generally not true. Similarly, when H = {i}, coalition SEQ would be reduced to individual SEQ stability.
If state s ∈ S is SEQ for every coalition H ⊆ N , it is called coalitionally SEQ stable and denoted by s ∈ S CSEQ . Xu et al. [22] extend coalition Nash stability proposed by Kilgour et al. [11] by including uncertain preference in the coalition Nash stability definitions. Depending on the focal coalition's attitude towards risks associated with uncertain moves [14] , aggressive and conservative coalition Nash stabilities are introduced [22] . As a preparation, a coalition improvement or uncertain move (CIUM) is defined first. H (s) requires each move in a legal sequence has to be a UIUM for the mover, but the preference relation between a final state and status quo for the coalition is not a concern at all. On the contrary, CR +,U H (s) ensures that all coalition members prefer the terminal state to the status quo or are uncertain about their preference between these two states without examining the relative preference for each individual move along the legal sequence. Next, definitions of conservative and aggressive coalition Nash stability can be introduced [22] . To be consistent with the four extension notation in Li et al. [14] , these two definitions are relabeled accordingly.
Definition 9 State s ∈ S is aggressively Nash stable for coalition H ⊆ N , denoted by
s ∈ S CN asha H , iff CR +,U H (s) = ∅.
Definition 10 State s ∈ S is conservatively Nash stable for coalition H ⊆ N , denoted by
Similar to the equilibrium concept in stability analysis under individual calculations, coalition Nash stability for aggressive and conservative DMs can be ascertained as follows:
If state s ∈ S is aggressively (or conservatively) Nash stable for every nonempty coalition H ⊆ N , it is called coalitionally aggressively (or conservatively) Nash stable and denoted by s ∈ S CN asha (or s ∈ S CN ash b ).
Although Definition 10 looks the same as Definition 4, they are different in the sense that Definition 10 is defined with preference uncertainty where uncertain moves are not strong enough motivation for the focal coalition to deviate from its status quo state. On the other hand, Definition 4 is defined for transitive graph models with simple preference and does not consider uncertain preference in its conception. As Nash stability does not examine countermoves by the opponents, similar to individual stability case in [14] 3 Coalition stability with preference uncertainty in the graph model Coalition Nash stability has been extended to general graph models with uncertain preference by Xu et al. [22] . This section will consider coalition GMR, SMR, and SEQ stabilities with preference uncertainty.
DMs may exhibit different attitudes towards uncertainty when making choices. For instance, an optimistic DM tends to view uncertainty as a potential opportunity while a pessimistic DM may often regard an uncertain outcome as a risk. In addition, a DM's attitude towards uncertainty change with its status quo state: a DM who has little to lose is more likely to take an aggressive attitude towards uncertainty and treat it as a potential gain. On the contrary, a DM who has little to gain is highly likely to regard uncertain outcomes as a risk and adopt a conservative stance. To accommodate different attitudes towards preference uncertainty, Li et al. [14] define individual Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ stabilities with preference uncertainty under four forms, a, b, c, and d. The purpose of these four extensions is to characterize a focal DM with diverse attitudes towards preference uncertainty, ranging from aggressive, to mixed and conservative. When coalition GMR, SMR, and SEQ stability definitions are extended from graph models with simple preference [8] to those with uncertain preference, these four extensions are maintained depending on the focal coalition's attitude towards preference uncertainty.
Definition 11 State s ∈ S is GMR for coalition H ⊆ N , denoted by s ∈ S
CGM Ra H
, iff for
Definition 12 State s ∈ S is SMR for coalition H ⊆ N , denoted by s ∈ S
CSM Ra H
Definition 13 State s ∈ S is SEQ for coalition H ⊆ N , denoted by s ∈ S
CSEQa H
In extension a, the focal coalition members are conceived to be aggressive as they are willing to deviate from the status quo state for uncertain outcomes (uncertainty is allowed at the incentive end for the focal coalition). While assessing sanctions from their opponents, at least one coalition member must be ascertained for a no-better-off position in order to successfully block the focal coalition (uncertainty is not allowed at the sanction end for the focal coalition).
Definition 14 State s ∈ S is GMR for coalition
H ⊆ N , denoted by s ∈ S CGM R b H , iff for every s 1 ∈ CR + H (s), there exists s 2 ∈ R N −H (s 1 ) such that s 2 ∈ Φ ⪯ H (s).
Definition 15 State s ∈ S is SMR for coalition H ⊆ N , denoted by s ∈ S
CSM R b H
Definition 16 State s ∈ S is SEQ for coalition H ⊆ N , denoted by s ∈ S
CSEQ b H
Compared to the coalition stability definitions in extension a, the only difference is that this extension does not treat uncertain moves as sufficient incentive for the focal coalition to deviate from the status quo. The focal coalition under this extension presumably exhibits mixed attitude towards preference uncertainty, conservative at the incentive end but aggressive at the sanction end [14] . Although Definitions 14, 15, and 16, respectively, look the same as Definitions 5, 6, and 7, they are in fact different in the sense that Definitions 14, 15, and 16 are conceived with preference uncertainty but uncertain moves are neither strong enough motivation for the focal coalition to deviate from the status quo nor allowed as valid sanctions to deter the focal coalition. On the other hand, Definitions 5, 6, and 7 are designed for graph models with simple preference.
For convenience, let Φ ⪯,U H (s) = {t ∈ S ∶ s ⪰ i t or s U i t for at least one i ∈ H}.
Definition 17 State s ∈ S is GMR for coalition H ⊆ N , denoted by s ∈ S
CGM Rc H
, iff for 
Definition 18 State s ∈ S is SMR for coalition H ⊆ N , denoted by s ∈ S
CSM
Extension c assumes that uncertain moves are allowed as sufficient incentives and sanctions for the focal coalition and is designed to characterize focal coalition members with mixed attitude towards preference uncertainty: aggressive at the incentive end but conservative at the sanction end.
Definition 20 State s ∈ S is GMR for coalition H ⊆ N , denoted by s ∈ S
CGM R d H
Definition 21 State s ∈ S is SMR for coalition H ⊆ N , denoted by s ∈ S
CSM R d H
Definition 22 State s ∈ S is SEQ for coalition H ⊆ N , denoted by s ∈ S
∈ S CGM R k , s ∈ S CSM R k , or s ∈ S CSEQ k , k = a, b, c, d. It is obvious that S CGM R k = ∩ H⊆N S CGM R k H , S CSM R k = ∩ H⊆N S CSM R k H , and S CSEQ k = ∩ H⊆N S CSEQ k H , k = a, b, c, d.
Interrelationships of coalition stabilities with preference uncertainty
For the four solution concepts, Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ, different interrelationships exist for individual stabilities with both simple preference [3] and uncertain preference [14] . This section examines interrelationships of coalition stabilities with preference uncertainty and the examination starts with interrelationships among the four coalition stabilities within each extension.
Theorem 1 Interrelationships of coalition stability for H within each extension. For a particular extension k ∈{a, b, c, d} and a nonempty
H ⊆ N , S CN ash k H ⊆ S CSEQ k H ⊆ S CGM R k H and S CN ash k H ⊆ S CSM R k H ⊆ S CGM R k H .
Proof:
The proof will be carried out for extension a only and the remaining three extensions can be proved similarly. Theorem 1 ascertains the interrelationships for the four coalition stabilities for a particular nonempty coalition within each extension. Given that for any extension k,
c, d, the following corollary immediately follows:
Corollary 1 Interrelationships of coalition stability within each extension For a partic-
The interrelationships of the four coalition stabilities within each extension can thus be depicted in a Venn diagram as shown in Fig. 1 . The result here is consistent with the interrelationships for individual stabilities with simple preference [3] and uncertain preference [14] as well as coalition stabilities with simple preference [9] . to [4] and [14] . A graph model was developed for this conflict with three DMs and each DM controlling one option as shown in Table 1 . In this model, DM 1 includes both the Federal Government of Canada and opposition groups, DM 2 is self-evident, and DM 3 stands for both the firm that proposed the Gisborne project and other groups that support bulk water export from Canada. A brief explanation is furnished in Table 1 for each option controlled by the corresponding DM.
The resulting eight feasible states are given in Table 2 , where a "Y" opposite an option indicates that the option is selected by the controlling DM and an "N" indicates the corresponding option is not chosen by the DM. To model the oscillation of the provincial government's attitude towards the Gisborne bulk water export conflict, Li et al. [14] introduced uncertain preference for DM 2 Provincial. The relative preference information for this conflict model is furnished in Table 3 .
For DM 2, except for the strict preference indicated in the four pairs of states enclosed within the curly brackets, remaining preference relations are assumed to be uncertain between any two states from any two different curly brackets. For instance, the provincial government prefers state s 3 to s 7 , but is uncertain about its preference between s 3 and any other states. Table 3 : Preference information for the Gisborne model [14] DMs Relative preference
An integrated graph of this conflict model is illustrated in Fig. 4 where the nodes correspond to the eight states and the DMs are labeled on the arcs to indicate the moves controlled by the DMs. Based on the moves controlled by each DM given in Fig. 4 , one can obtain the reachable list for each of the seven nonempty coalitions as shown in Table 4 , where a particular coalition is identified by an appropriate subscript in columns 2 through 8.
This coalition reachable list information is needed for determining coalition improvement lists and coalition improvement or uncertain move lists as well as examining countermoves by an opponent coalition in assessing CGMR and CSMR stabilities.
By incorporating DMs' preference information into the coalition reachable lists, the following coalition improvement or uncertain move lists can be derived as given in Table Table 4 : Coalition reachable lists for the Gisborne model (s 7 ) = {s 3 } as only s 3 is highlighted by an overline, indicating that it is a coalition improvement for the grand coalition N = {1, 2, 3}
relative to the status quo state s 7 . Similarly, Table 5 shows that R
(s 1 ) = ∅ as none of the CIUMs starting from s 1 is identified as a coalition improvement for H = {1, 2} by an overline. The information in Table 5 will play a significant role in determining whether a focal coalition will be possibly motivated to deviate from a status quo in coalition stability.
In assessing CSEQ stability, one has to examine the credibility of the sanction by the opponents N −H. Table 6 furnishes this information. Since a nonempty coalition will not be examined for CSEQ stability, its opponents, the grand coalition N , is thus excluded from Table 6 . By utilizing the information in Tables 4, 5 , and 6, one can conduct a coalition analysis for CNash, CGMR, CSMR, and CSEQ under the four extensions as defined in Sections 2 and 3. As mentioned earlier, this paper treats coalition analysis as a follow-up analysis after a standard stability analysis. Therefore, only predicted equilibria under individual calculations are examined for coalition stability.
A stability analysis by Li et al. [14] reveals that states s 4 , s 6 , and s 8 possess some equilibrium status under various circumstances. As this research treats coalition analysis as a follow-up analysis after a standard stability analysis, coalition stability is examined for these three states only. The analysis result is summarized in Tables 7 (for CNash and CGMR stabilities) and 8 (for CSMR and CSEQ stabilities). For the sake of space, each coalition is simply identified by the corresponding DM(s) without curly brackets.
For instance, 12 in the second row of Tables 7 and 8 stands for coalition H = {1, 2}.
A √ in the column of a particular coalition in Tables 7 and 8 indicates that a state is stable for this coalition under a specific extension of a coalition solution concept (CSC).
If a state is stable for all nonempty coalitions under an extension of a CSC, a √ is placed in the appropriate cell in the column for the particular CSC, indicating that the state is coalitionally stable for this CSC in terms of the specific extension. For instance, and s 6 will be sustainable resolutions under both individual and coalition considerations.
[14] also indicates that states s 4 and s 6 are GMR, SMR, and SEQ equilibria under extension c. Table 7 
Conclusions
This article incorporates preference uncertainty into coalition analysis under three solution concepts, GMR, SMR, and SEQ, in the framework of the graph model for conflict resolution. The interrelationships are investigated for the four coalition solution concepts, CNash, CGMR, CSMR, and CSEQ within each extension and across the four extensions. The proposed development is illustrated by a bulk-water export conflict occurred in Canada and structural insights are garnered about how the conflict may be
